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Consumers' social identities stem from comparisons between themselves and others. These identities help determine consumption decisions.
Unfortunately, perceptions of comparative traits and characteristics are frequently biased, which can lead to similarly biased consumption
decisions. Five studies show that two incidental but commonplace marketing decisions can influence consumers' estimates of their relative
standing and thus their social identities by influencing estimates of how other consumers are distributed.
© 2015 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Availability; Identity; Distribution estimates; Social identity; Relative standingIdentities are mental representations of how people view
themselves through their traits, goals, and characteristics
(Oyserman, 2009). Individuals maintain multiple identities, both
personal (focusing on characteristics of the individual) and social.
Social identities are linked to a social role or group that a person
was, is, or may become a member of (e.g., golfer, conservative,
environmentalist, trivia expert, or tall person) and therefore differ
from personal identities in that they require social comparison.
Ample research shows how consumers' identities influence
their attitudes and choices. For example, global versus local
identities can influence preferences for products targeted to global
versus local markets (Zhang & Khare, 2009). Moral and gender
identities can influence charitable donations associated with in-
versus out-groups (Winterich, Mittal, & Ross, 2009). Social
identities can influence food choices and alcohol consumption
(Berger & Rand, 2008). The desire to validate and communicate
identities has even been linked to brand choices (Aaker, 1997;
Chernev, Hamilton, & Gal, 2011). In addition, identities have been
shown to influence self-regulation and impulsiveness in purchase
behavior and consumption, especially when one's identity is⁎ Corresponding author.
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1057-7408© 2015 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. Aperceived as less valued compared to others (Johnson, Richeson, &
Finkel, 2011; Verplanken & Sato, 2011).
An important element in the construction and understanding
of social identities is comparison with others (Berger & Rand,
2008; Festinger, 1954; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988).
Identities about intelligence, commitment to a cause, athleticism,
and even body size are inherently relative (e.g. Biernat, 2003;
Oyserman, 2001; Raeff, 1997). That is, people assess their own
position compared to others – their relative standing – in the
process of assessing their identity in these types of domains.
Identity-relevant perceptions of relative standing are impor-
tant because they can affect choices such as clothing size,
serving size, and sophistication level of athletic or technology
products. For example, consumers prefer higher end and more
advanced products if they identify themselves as above average
in a given domain (e.g. Burson, 2007). Given this role of
perceived relative standing in consumption decisions, it is
important that researchers explore factors that may influence
them as they may lead to biased consumption.
The current research explores how subtle contextual cues in
shopping environments may shift consumers' estimates of
relative standing, not by altering estimates of consumers' own
abilities, behaviors, or traits, but instead by influencing
estimates of how others in the population are distributed acrossll rights reserved.
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two simple manipulations that are common to the marketplace:
categorization schemas provided for self-identification, and
targeting of consumers in distributional extremes. Five studies
(examining intelligence, athletic ability, environmental con-
cern, political conservatism, and physical characteristics) show
that a) these manipulations influence estimates of how others
are distributed, b) these estimates influence relative perceptions
of one's self, and c) they lead to identity-congruent behaviors,
all without necessarily shifting consumers perceptions of their
own absolute abilities, behaviors, or traits.
Theoretical background
People regularly make comparative judgments of their own
traits, attitudes, behaviors, and characteristics (e.g., Festinger,
1954; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). For consumers, these
judgments are important for product search (Moorman, Diehl,
Brinberg, & Kidwell, 2004), choice (Burson, 2007; Gershoff
& Burson, 2011; Prelec, Wernerfelt, & Zettelmeyer, 1997),
and intentions to seek medical treatment (Menon, Block, &
Ramanathan, 2002). Unfortunately, these judgments are prone to
systematic biases. Even after correctly estimating their absolute
standing (e.g. own knowledge in a domain), judges overestimate
the dispersion of other consumers (others' knowledge), so they
imagine more people below them when their absolute standing
happens to be high, and more above them when absolute standing
happens to be low (Gershoff & Burson, 2011).
Nisbett and Kunda (1985) argued that overly-disperse
distributions are imagined because instances at the extremes
are more cognitively available than those in the middle.
Manipulating availability has been shown to exacerbate this:
Participants seeing pictures of tall (short) consumers believed
they were relatively shorter (taller) than others because they
imagined more people in the available tail of the distribution
(Gershoff & Burson, 2011).
Though the impact of explicitly increasing the availability of
extreme others is relevant to marketing contexts, results such as
this could easily be attributed to heavy-handed manipulations:
Participants must estimate a distribution for which they are
provided only extreme members, so of course they incorporate
that relevant data. Thus, in the present experiments, we
examine the role of more subtle yet normatively irrelevant
cues that may influence distributional estimates.
A large body of research has shown that relative estimates
about a wide array of topics can be systematically manipulated
(see Moore, 2007 for a review). In some cases, manipulations
that cause participants to shift the imagined distribution of
others on some target trait or characteristic and thus their
placement in that distribution are also essentially shifting their
social identity. Social identities are contextualized, highly
sensitive to situational cues, and can be subtly cued without the
consumer's awareness (Oyserman, 2009; Oyserman, Elmore, &
Smith, 2012). One such contextual cue is how we compare to
others (Oyserman, 2001).
We identify two marketing conventions that can subtly
influence consumers' identities by shaping comparisons withothers—marketer provided category schemas and the
marketer's product mix decisions. First, marketers often
provide a category schema and ask consumers to identify
which category they belong to. For example, a clothing store
might ask consumers to identify themselves as petite, small,
medium, large, misses, x-large, etc. When presented with such
schemas, consumers tend to believe that there is reason and
purpose in the asking: Categories meaningfully discriminate
among consumers (Grice, 1975). Indeed, it would not be useful
to offer a schema in which all consumers fell into the same
category. So, when consumers are given category options, they
rationally assume that those options are meaningful—that the
endpoints of the set of categories will contain people in the
extremes of the distribution and points in the middle will
contain those who are more typical (e.g., Schwarz, 1994, 1996,
1999; Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985; Schwarz &
Scheuring, 1988).
Prior research exploring how people report their own behavior
supports this notion. For example, respondents reported watching
more television when possible responses included more categories
of frequent watching, compared to when there were more possible
responses of infrequent watching (Schwarz et al., 1985). And,
there is some evidence that estimates of the “average citizen’s”
behavior are also shifted by category manipulations (see also
Schwarz & Scheuring, 1988). Social identity hinges on assump-
tions about others, and some information about others comes from
the categorization schema. In fact, the more one thinks about
others, the more one is susceptible to schema manipulations
(Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Kühnen, & Ji, 2002).
While this past work assumes that changes in relative
estimates also occur, we strive to document those category-
driven shifts. We propose that the category schemas that group
consumers influence the way in which consumers see the full
distribution of others, even in domains in which perceptions of
their own absolute behaviors, attitudes, or abilities, remain
fixed. This change in the perception of others alone biases how
consumers see themselves relative to others. If consumers are
likely to overly distribute others across all possible categories,
then providing more categories at one end or the other of the
range of performances should influence their estimates of
others. This will lead to biased perceptions of relative standing –
higher estimates of relative standing when there are many low
categories and lower estimates of relative standing when there
are many high categories – and this, in turn, will influence
perceptions of social identity. In Studies 1–3, we test this
possibility across five identity-relevant domains.
A second potential influence on consumer identity occurs
when retailers target consumers at a distributional extreme. For
example, Casual Male Big and Tall sells clothing for larger
men. Similarly, many online stores specialize in products
geared toward those who hold strong Liberal views while
others focus on those with extreme Conservative views. When
retailers target consumers at the extremes they may also
influence perceptions of the distribution of others and therefore
where respondents fall in that distribution.
Since consumers often consider the individuals who are a
brand's typical users (Aaker, 1991; McCracken, 1989), if a
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bring to mind tall individuals who might be the store's primary
customers. Indeed, Oyserman has described this interaction
between social identities and product arrays: “When nothing
looks right for the shopper trying on clothes in the store, a
salient ‘out of shape’ identity makes for a different understand-
ing than a salient ‘academic’ identity” (2009; p. 251). We take
this logic a step further. We predict that bringing to mind stores
that target consumers in the extremes (very tall people or very
liberal people) will also shift the estimated distribution of
others' heights or political leanings, and although it is unlikely
to change a consumer's absolute beliefs or estimate of his
own absolute height, it can nevertheless alter the consumer's
relative estimate.
In Studies 4 and 5, we show that a retail product mix that
highlights products designed for a tail of a consumer distribu-
tion may not move absolute estimates of self, but nevertheless
will pull estimates of other consumers toward the tail, and
therefore influence social identity by shifting estimates of
relative standing away from that tail.Studies 1–3
The first three studies explore whether varying consumer
categorization schemas changes imagined distributions of
others, relative standing, and perceptions of social identity.
Past work has shown how response scales may affect people's
estimates of their own absolute behavior (“How much TV do I
watch?”; Schwarz et al., 1985), especially when the domain is a
frequent, yet inconsequential behavior (Menon et al., 1995).
Unlike prior work, we employed this scale only for estimates
about others (“How much TV do others watch?”), essentially
holding estimates of absolute behavior or characteristics fixed.
We then observe distributional shifts and corresponding shifts
in consumers' perceptions of relative standing in four identity
domains.
All domains involved perceptions of identity-relevant traits
and characteristics. Study 1 had two domains (Intelligence and
Athletic Ability). Study 2 examined Conservatism/Liberalism.
Study 3 examined environmentalism. In every study, partici-
pants provided three primary measures: 1) Absolute standing
for the relevant trait or characteristic (either by estimating or by
taking a quiz to measure it, depending on study), 2) An estimate
of how 100 other participants were distributed into categories
of standing, 3) An estimate of their own relative standing.1
Depending on categorization-schema condition, there were
either more categories at the low or the high end of the scale
(following Schwarz, 1999). Specifically, within domain, all
participants estimated the distribution of 100 others across the
same range and into the same number of categories. However
the categorization schema differed in the breadth of categories1 Study 1 presented participants with three, counterbalanced domains. One
domain (cell phone usage) was not included in the analyses because it is not
clearly applicable to identity. Because that data was analyzed within domain
rather than as part of a within-subject design, this repeated feature is not
discussed.at the low versus high end of the scale. This was achieved by
using narrower increments at the scale's extremes. In the Low
condition, the schema offered separate categories for each low
score (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) but fewer, wider categories for high
scores (16 to 20). In the High condition, the schema offered
separate categories for high scores (16, 17, 18, 19, 20) but
fewer, wider categories for low scores (1 to 5).
Note that individuals who assume both that categories have
been incremented in a meaningful way and that there should be
a wide dispersion across categories will automatically allocate a
similar number of others to each category in the schema
regardless of its breadth. As a result, this will produce greater
mass over the narrow range categories in a distribution, whether
they lay at the low or high end of the response scale. Critically,
this will impact participants' inferences about their relative
standing without impacting their absolute standing because
they rely on these inferred distributions in their estimates of
relative standing.
Method
All studies were computer-based, Study 1 using laboratory
participants and 2 and 3 using Mechanical Turk participants.
Participants answered questions within the domains of
Intelligence and Athletic Ability (Study 1), Conservatism/
Liberalism (Study 2), or Environmentalism (Study 3; see
Table 1 for more details).
First, participants' absolute standing was collected. This was
measured in Study 1 via estimates about specific tasks related
to the identity domain (e.g. number of correct trivia answers
out of 20; see Table 1). In Study 2, absolute standing was
calculated for participants using items from the Pew Center
Political Typology Quiz. In Study 3, absolute standing was
similarly calculated and provided after participants responded
to a quiz composed of 12 environmental beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors.
Next, in all three studies, participants were asked to estimate
the distribution of 100 randomly selected participants on the
target trait or characteristic onto scales of varied increments,
manipulated to have more (narrow) categories at either the high
or the low end (see Table 1 for increments in each condition of
each domain in each study). Finally, in all studies participants
provided their relative standing by estimating the number of
other participants who were below them on the target trait or
characteristic.
Results
Estimates of relative standing
First, across all domains there was no difference in
participants' absolute standing estimates (Study 1) nor actual
absolute standing (Studies 2 and 3) by High versus Low category
schema condition (ts b 1.5, NS). Thus, any effects on relative
standing would be due entirely to changes in how others were
perceived. Indeed, estimates of relative standing did differ
depending on condition. In all four domains, participants'
estimates of the number of people who would fall below them
Table 1
Methodological details for Studies 1–3.





Intelligence 1 303 Zero Zero
20 questions of Trivial Pursuit. 1 to 5 1
6 to 10 2
11 to 15 3
16 4
17 5
18 6 to 10
19 11 to 15
20 16 to 20
Athletic ability 1 303 12 or less 12 or less
Putting a golf ball into a cup. 13 to 48 13 to 24
49 to 60 25 to 36
61 to 72 37 to 48
73 to 84 49 to 60
85 to 96 61 to 72
97 to 108 73 to 84
109 to 120 85 to 120
121 or more 121 or more
Conservatism 2 121 10–35 10–15







Environmentalism 3 120 0–19 0–4
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for others at the low end of the distribution) than Low conditions
(see Table 2 for results).Distributions of others
Support for the proposed mechanism was found in
participants' estimated distribution of others. Fig. 1 visually
captures the shifts in the density of the distributions in response
to the manipulation. In order to statistically test these shifts, we
used standard cutoffs (Gershoff & Burson, 2011; Nisbett &
Kunda, 1985) to create three measures of distribution density in
each domain—one for each tail of the distribution and one for
the middle.2 We then conducted repeated measures ANOVAs
in each domain with distribution density (middle, lower, and
upper tail) as a within-subject variable and High versus Low
category schema condition as a between-subject variable.2 These measures were created by summing the categories together. One
distribution category was excluded from the middle categories, as recommend-
ed by Steenkamp, Allenby, Gupta, and Verducci (2001). In two domains
(Intelligence and Environmentalism), discarding a middle category meant
eliminating the measure of the middle altogether, which reduced the within-
subject measure to only 2 levels (upper tail and lower tail).All four domains showed the expected interaction on
distribution density suggesting that the category schema
manipulation influenced imagined distributions (Intelligence,
F(1, 301) = 109.29, p b .001, ηp
2 = .266; Athletic Ability,
F(2, 602) = 54.87, p b .001, ηp
2 = .154; Conservatism, F(2,
238) = 183.53, p b .001, ηp
2 = .607; Environmentalism, F(1,
118) = 167.11, p b .001, ηp
2 = .586). Contrasts confirmed that
the tails of the estimated distributions differed by condition (see
Table 3).
Further support for the proposed mechanism was obtained by
exploring whether participants' estimates of the distributions of
others statistically explained their relative estimates. First we
looked at participants' estimated distributions and calculated
what we called a “derived relative standing,” which was the
number of people from each participant's estimated distribution
who fell below that participant's absolute standing. Next we used
a two-step regression process (see Gershoff & Burson, 2011). In
the first step, estimates of relative standing were regressed on
individuals' absolute scores. The second step included the
derived measure in the model (see Table 4). Not surprisingly, in
the first step, absolute scores predicted estimates of relative
standing. More importantly, supporting the role of estimated
distributions, in all domains, R-square increased when derived
relative standing was in the model. In fact, in all domains,
participants' absolute standing was no longer a significant
predictor when derived relative standing was included. This
means that the shape of the estimated distributions impacted
estimates of relative standing, so changes in distribution shape
due to the category schema manipulation subsequently changed
perceptions of relative standing.
Identity congruence
A large body of literature predicts identity-congruent behavior
when a particular identity is made salient (see Bhattacharjee,
Berger, & Menon, 2014). If we have truly manipulated social
identity and that identity is relevant to the task at hand,
preferences should also differ by condition (Oyserman et al.,
2012). Therefore, after the relative standing measures in Study 3,
we also asked for participants' purchase preferences and in-
tentions on seven identity-relevant items (e.g. “I will try to use
less energy today”, see Appendix A) on 1–7 scales. The scales
were combined into one composite variable of “Congruence”
(Cronbach's α = .80). Congruence was found to depend on
condition. Those led to believe they were more environmentally
conscious than others were also more likely to say they would
behave accordingly than those led to believe they were less
environmentally conscious than others (MHigh = 4.25, SD = 1.22
vs. MLow = 4.66, SD = 1.11; t(118) = 1.94, p = .055; Cohen's
d = − .352; CI.95 = − .009, .833).
Discussion
Studies 1 through 3 showed that the categorization schema
available for distributing others impacts social identity as
measured by relative standing and downstream variables such
as energy consumption. Consistent with prior work on how
consumers interpret response scales (Schwarz, 1994), we show
3 In the liberal condition, the stores were The Liberal Store, Zazzle Liberal T-
shirts, Hippie Shop, Liberated Liberal Political Gear, and Democratic Stuff. For
the conservative condition, the stores were Patriot Depot, Right Wing Stuff,
Major Surplus and Survival, Zazzle American Elephant, and Conservative
Buys. A manipulation check confirmed that participants believed that the liberal
websites were intended for more liberal consumers than conservative
consumers (Ms = 5.14 vs. 2.40 on 7-point scales, t(122) = 20.33, p b .001).
Similarly, participants believed that the conservative websites were intended for
more conservative consumers than liberal consumers (Ms = 5.82 vs. 2.53,
t(123) = 20.20, p b .001).
4 After viewing the website, participants in this study also estimated the
distribution of heights of 100 other people participating in the study by
indicating the number that would fall into each of seven categories, 5′2″ or
shorter; 5′3″ to 5′5″, 5′6″ to 5′8″, 5′9″ to 5′11″, 6′0″ to 6′2″, 6′3″ to 6′5″, and
6′6″ or taller. Using the analyses employed in Studies 1–3, we once again found
the expected interaction on category density (F(2, 828) = 21.43, p b .001).
Contrasts revealed that participants shifted others from the bottom distribution
category to the middle distribution category in the Tall condition (Fs N 15.5,
ps b .001). Furthermore, when the derived relative standing measure was
included in a two-step regression, it predicted participants' estimates of relative
height (B = .236, t(416) = 2.99, p b .005), while actual own height was no
longer significant (B = -.005, t(416) = -.07, NS). As in Studies 1–3, the shape
of the estimated distribution predicted estimates of relative standing, thus
changes in estimates of that distribution changed perceived relative standing.
Table 2
Absolute standing and relative standing estimates by condition for Studies 1–3.
Domain N Distribution categories t CI low CI high Cohen's d
High condition Low condition
Intelligence (Study 1)
Mean absolute standing: estimated number of correctly
answered Trivial Pursuit questions, out of 20 (SD)
303 9.92 (4.88) 10.70 (4.20) 1.48 − .26 1.82
Mean relative standing: estimated number of other participants
scoring worse than themselves (SD)
35.99 (26.09) 56.64 (25.84) 6.89 ⁎⁎⁎ 14.75 1.81 .794
Athletic ability (Study 1)
Mean absolute standing: estimatedmaximum distance (converted
to inches) to putt a ball into a cup
303 69.60 (66.77) 61.88 (71.95) .93 2.55 18.67
Mean relative standing: estimated number of other participants
putting shorter distances than themselves (SD)
29.15 (32.48) 39.75 (37.84) 2.59 ⁎⁎ −23.98 8.56 .299
Conservatism (Study 2)
Mean absolute standing: actual conservatism score (SD) 121 32.98 (13.28) 35.83 (10.18) 1.31 −1.44 7.13
Mean relative standing: estimated number of other participants
less conservative than themselves (SD)
31.40 (20.71) 39.66 (18.88) 2.29 ⁎ 1.11 15.41 .420
Environmentalism (Study 3)
Mean absolute standing: actual environmentalism score (SD) 120 23.88 (5.94) 24.03 (4.65) .15 −1.78 2.08
Mean relative standing: estimated number of other participants
less environmental than themselves (SD)
33.72 (18.41) 45.63 (19.55) 3.44 ⁎⁎⁎ 5.05 18.78 .633
Note. CIs are confidence intervals around the difference between high and low condition estimates.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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groupings, they estimate that more others fall into the same
range compared to when they are presented with a single wider
grouping. Identity–congruent behavior follows when relative
standing seems relevant to the task at hand.
In addition to task-specific influences like response scales, a
retailer offering a product mix targeted to just one end of a
distribution of consumers may also impact estimates about
others and thus relative standing and social identity. Unlike
past work that has explicitly (and perhaps heavy-handedly)
provided examples of extreme others, the next two studies
allow the participants to infer those examples naturally. Fur-
thermore, we remove the explicit task of providing distributions
of others to ensure our effects do not depend on this step.
Studies 4 and 5
Studies 4 and 5 explore the role of the cognitive availability
of stores and products in influencing consumers' estimates
of their relative standing. In both studies, participants were
exposed to websites that sold products specifically for
consumers in distributional tails and estimated their own
relative liberalism or height.
Method
All participants were recruited from online panels. Like the
previous studies, they first indicated absolute standing: In
Study 4, 247 participants self-reported how liberal they were on
a 10-point scale. In Study 5, 420 participants provided their
height in feet and inches. Next, participants examined imagesof websites for online retailers. Depending on condition, the
websites made salient products for consumers at one extreme
of the distribution or the other. In Study 4, participants
evaluated five actual websites that sell products for liberals
or for conservatives.3 In Study 5, participants saw one
(fictitious) store—named either “Shopping Taller” or “Shop-
ping Shorter”—that offered resources for buying products for
taller or shorter consumers.4 Finally, participants estimated
relative standing by providing the number of 100 participants
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** indicates increment expanded to smaller units in the high condition.
Fig. 1. Estimates of others' by response category schema condition for Studies 1–3.
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In Study 4, despite random assignment, by chance there was a
significant difference in absolute standing in liberalism bycondition (p = .037). This measure was collected first in the
study, prior to any manipulation, so it is impossible that we
influenced it. Therefore, we controlled for it by including it in an
ANCOVA on relative standing. As predicted, in the Conservative
Table 3
Contrasts showing change in density for Studies 1–3.
Domain N Change in density low-high condition (SE) F CI low CI high ηp
2
Intelligence (Study 1) 303 Change in lower tail 29.14 (2.75) 112.08 ⁎⁎ 23.73 34.56 .271
Change in upper tail −24.09 (2.59) 86.46 ⁎⁎ −29.19 −18.99 .223
Athletic ability (Study 1) 303 Change in lower tail 22.58 (3.10) 53.10 ⁎⁎ 16.49 28.68 .150
Change in middle −8.89 (1.68) 28.15 ⁎⁎ −12.19 −5.60 .086
Change in upper tail −15.19 (2.00) 57.77 ⁎⁎ −19.12 −11.26 .161
Conservatism (Study 2) 121 Change in lower tail 42.88 (3.08) 194.54 ⁎⁎ 36.80 48.97 .620
Change in middle −2.032 (1.06) 3.67 1.105 15.412 .030
Change in upper tail −39.85 (2.97) 180.31 ⁎⁎ −45.72 −33.97 .602
Environmentalism (Study 3) 120 Change in lower tail 40.15 (3.66) 120.21 ⁎⁎ 32.90 47.40 .505
Change in upper tail −42.25 (3.19) 175.08 ⁎⁎ −48.57 −35.93 .597
⁎⁎ p b .001.
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liberal than more people (M = 46.24, SD = 1.82) than in
the Liberal website condition (M = 41.21, SD = 1.82; F(1,
244) = 3.79, p = .053, ηp
2 = .015; CI.95 = −10.12, .06).
In Study 5, there was no significant difference in actual
height of participants by Short (M = 66.55 inches, SD = 4.17)
and Tall conditions (M = 66.22 inches, SD = 3.76, t(418) = .84,
p = .404). However, as expected, estimates of relative height
were affected by the manipulation. In the Short condition,
participants estimated being relatively taller than more people
(M = 35.06, SD = 25.17) than in the Tall condition (M = 27.77;
t(418) = 3.00, p = .003; Cohen's d = .294; CI.95 = 2.52,
12.06).
Discussion
As in Studies 1–3, we observe that a commonplace cue
about others played a critical role in participants' perceptions of
their own standing relative to others. These two studies show
that manipulating the availability of retailers carrying products
for the high or low end of the distribution influenced estimates
of relative standing on two identity relevant domains—being a
liberal/conservative person or being a tall/short person.
General discussion
Consumers' judgments about themselves are dynamically
created in context (Oyserman et al., 2012). Their socialTable 4
Regression parameters predicting estimates of relative standing in Studies 1–3.
Domain Estimate of self ‘Derived re
Intelligence (Study 1) Step 1 1.788 ⁎⁎ (.335) –
Step 2 − .026 (.332) .551 ⁎⁎ (.05
Athletic Ability (Study 1) Step 1 .172 ⁎⁎ (.029) –
Step 2 − .009 (.036) .509 ⁎⁎ (.51
Conservatism (Study 2) Step 1 .875 ⁎ (.149) –
Step 2 .263 (.238) .273 ⁎ (.085
Environmentalism (Study 3) Step 1 .169 (.343) –
Step 2 .160 (.288) .374 ⁎⁎ (.05
Note: Parameters are unstandardized betas. Standard errors are in parentheses. CI
standing.
⁎ Denotes significance at p b .05.
⁎⁎ Denotes significance at p b .001, R-square change from step 1 to step 2 significidentities inherently hinge on comparisons with others. Our
studies show that they are influenced by commonplace features
of consumption contexts that also impact behavior. Shifts
observed in relative perceptions are explained by shifts in
estimates about the distribution of others, and thus might be
predicted and avoided.
The studies reported here show that people's estimates about
others are sensitive to quite subtle cues because they influence
estimates of how others are distributed. In Studies 1–3, we
observed differences in estimated distributions of others by
influencing the number of separate groups in which people could
fall at either end of the distribution. Altering this distribution
shifted participants' estimates of traits and characteristics relative
to others. Similarly, in Studies 4 and 5, we show that highlighting
retailers who offer products for those in the tails of a distribution
can change estimates of individuals' traits and characteristics
relative to others. Perceptions of others can in fact explain the
entire shift. For instance, despite the fact that participants' own
height cannot change, we saw a difference in relative estimates of
the heights in Study 5. Note also that the shifts produce biased
perceived identities because participants cannot be simultaneous-
ly taller than only one-quarter of people and taller than more than
one-third of people. Future research can extend these results by
exploring the extent to which consumers “own” these social
identities bymeasuring the importance or centrality of the relative
perceptions.
These insights are relevant for choice architecture decisions.
First, marketers must realize that, though consumers may havelative standing’ R-square Cohen's f2 CI low CI high
.087
1) .339 .513 .450 .652
.111
1) .249 .332 .371 .647
.265
) .338 .511 .105 .442
.002
2) .305 .439 .271 .478
s are confidence intervals around the parameter estimates for derived relative
ant at p b .002 for all four domains.
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conceptions. Categories provided by marketers may influence
this. For example, the ski area Vail uses a nine level system to
categorize skiing ability. However, on its website (www.vail.
com) the same nine categories are grouped in four sections as
level 1, levels 2 to 4, levels 5 and 6, and levels 7 to 9. The
research presented here suggests that skiers derive different
relative perceptions depending on which schema they see: The
four-category schema may lead to relative overestimation
because the more narrowly defined level 1 category may be
interpreted as indicating that a sizeable proportion of the
population falls into this category, and that tail becomes
cognitively available. When safety is a marketer's primary goal,
employing the results of the last two studies may offset the
effects shown in the first three to help consumers select
appropriate products. For instance, a home page featuring the
high end of available products (targeting the most skilled skiers,
for example), could help push down inflated perceptions of
relative standing.
Finally, this work suggests that, because forming a social
identity requires the critical step of considering others as well as
simply assessing absolute standing, social identities may be
more susceptible to subtle situational cues than personal iden-
tities. Future research exploring situational cues that shift both
of these components at once might shed light on differences in
the malleability of each component.Appendix A. Measures of identity-congruence in Study 3
“There are many brands and types of soaps on the market.
Each advertises itself as being good for one group of people or
another.
Below are descriptions of pairs of soaps. Indicate which you
would prefer and by how much, if you were to make a choice
for soap right now.” (7-point scales anchored by the following)
“A good choice for ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS
PEOPLE” and “A good choice for ACTIVE PEOPLE”
“A good choice for ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS
PEOPLE” and “A good choice for WORKING PEOPLE”
“A good choice for ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS
PEOPLE” and “A good choice for GERM CONCERNED
PEOPLE”
“A good choice for ENVIRONMENTALY CONSCIOUS
PEOPLE” and “A good choice for YOUNG PEOPLE”
“A good choice for ENVIRONMENTALLY CONSCIOUS
PEOPLE” and “A good choice for MATURE PEOPLE”
“Rate your agreement with the following statements” (1–7
Likert scale)
I will try to use less water today.
I will try to use less energy today.Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2015.01.008.References
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